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Cultivating Teachers’ Morality: The Pedagogy of Emotional Rationality 
 
 
Minkang Kim 
The University of Sydney 
 
 
Abstract: Teachers are expected to act ethically and provide moral 
role models in performing their duties, even though teacher education 
has often relegated the cultivation of teachers’ ethical awareness and 
moral development to the margins. When it is addressed, the main 
theoretical assumptions have relied heavily on the cognitivist 
developmental theories of Piaget and Kohlberg.  A major 
pedagogical problem in adopting these theories of moral reasoning is 
that they may not help teachers to act as moral agents in real-life 
classrooms. This paper argues that one underlying difficulty is the 
insufficient attention given to the role of emotion in moral reasoning, 
even though it is increasingly accepted that rationality is laced with 
emotions and, moreover, emotions are crucial in brain functioning. 
This paper presents recent empirical findings, viewing them through 
the lens of dynamic systems theory, and discusses how they may help 
to inform and strengthen the cultivation of teachers’ moral/ethical 
literacy in teacher education. 
 
 
Introduction 
 
There is a general and long-standing expectation among parents, policy makers, and 
teacher educators that newly qualified teachers entering the profession need to be morally 
aware.  Parents expect teachers to be moral role models for their children and, in Australia 
for example, the standards set by the New South Wales Institute of Teachers (NSWIT) require 
that courses of teacher education ensure ‘teachers adopt professional ethics with regard to 
their own conduct and that of others’ (p. 3). Also, teachers are expected to ‘demonstrate 
ethical behaviour’ (p. 14). However, despite the expectations of the public and government 
directives, student teachers’ moral and ethical development still seems to be regarded as 
peripheral in teacher training programmes. Even where there are recognised courses dealing 
with teachers’ moral and ethical development, as reported in Cummings et al. (2007) for 
example, these are largely reliant on a cognitive developmental approach (e.g. Piaget, 
Kohlberg and Rest) whose validity is now questioned in mainstream developmental science 
(Thelen & Smith, 1994, 2006; Lapsley & Narvaez, 2005; Lapsley & Hill, 2008; Frimer & 
Walker, 2008; Kim & Sankey, 2009).   
Two main criticisms of the cognitivist approach are that it is founded on a linear (stage-
like) notion of development, onwards and upwards with pre-determined starting points and 
endpoints, and it has ignored the impact of emotional experiences on moral learning and 
behaviour.  On the other hand, opposition to this approach, mounted by social intuitionists 
such as Jonathan Haidt (2001, 2008, 2012), does away with developmental stages and 
emphasises what he calls the role of moral emotions.  Haidt contends that ‘moral intuitions 
(including moral emotions) come first and directly cause moral judgements’ and that ‘moral 
intuition is a kind of cognition, but it is not a kind of reasoning’ (Haidt, 2001, p. 814).  He 
also suggests that ‘moral education programs that focus on building strengths and triggering 
the positive moral emotions may be more effective than the more traditional reasoning-
oriented interventions’ (Haidt, 2003, p. 286).  In addition to his dualistic view of reason and 
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emotion, Haidt’s notion of positive emotions seems to be a product of so-called positive 
psychology, that is at best questionable, and his intuitionist model is indebted to Hume’s 
emotivism and falls prey to the accusation of self-defeating moral relativism.   
This paper will be concerned with emotion in morality, but it is important to indicate from 
the start that, in emphasising the role emotion plays in moral reasoning, I am neither 
denigrating the importance of moral reasoning nor am I advocating emotivism or moral 
relativism, as exemplified by Haidt.  Rather, this paper is arguing that both models, 
cognitivism and Haidt’s social intuitionism, are founded on a misleading dichotomy between 
reason and emotion (Sankey & Kim, 2013). Both models provide us with an unacceptable 
either/or.  An important aim of this paper is therefore to provide a non-linear account of 
moral reasoning and action that rectifies the shortcomings of linear cognitivist models of 
morality by emphasising the role of emotion, without falling into the clutches of intuitivism 
and emotivism.   In seeking an alternative ‘third-way’, this paper will adopt a dynamics 
approach to moral development.  Dynamic Systems Theory (DST) is rapidly becoming a 
new metatheory in human development, as an alternative to cognitive theory (Overton, 2006, 
2007; Kim & Sankey, 2009, 2010; Spencer et al., 2011; van Geert, 2011; Hollestein, 2011).  
The paper will highlight the role of emotion in moral behaviour and the neurobiological link 
between moral emotions and lower-level brain systems, when viewed through the lens of DST.  
It will also consider recent findings from neurobiological studies employing a dynamics 
approach, which provide new insights into human rationality and the role of emotion in moral 
development (Lewis, 2005a, 2005b). The underlying rationale for using dynamics theory is 
that brains and ‘neurons are dynamical systems’ (Izhikevich, 2010, p.7).  
The origins of dynamics theory, also known as complexity or chaos theory, are in 
mathematics and physics, and it encompasses the realisation that, contrary to the Newtonian 
worldview, the natural world is often deeply unpredictable even though it is deterministic.  
We are often not able to know all the initial conditions or ‘biases’ of any developing system, 
and small fluctuations in initial conditions can have highly unpredictable outcomes. This was 
strikingly captured by one of the pioneers of complexity theory, Edward Lorentz (1972), in 
his notion of the ‘butterfly effect’; the revolutionary idea that the flapping of a butterfly’s 
wings in one part of the world could lead to a tornado in another.  In developmental 
psychology, Esther Thelen and Linda Smith (1994) were early pioneers with their seminal 
work A Dynamic Systems Approach to the Development of Cognition and Action. In recent 
years, a number of authors have applied the same approach to the relationship between 
emotions and human rationality (Lewis, 2005a, 2005b), spiritual development (Cupit, 2007), 
and moral development (Kim & Sankey, 2009). The main purpose of this paper is to continue 
this debate in the context of teacher education and the cultivation of teachers’ moral and 
ethical awareness, focusing particularly on the role that emotions play in moral development 
and decision-making; the values we espouse, how we think and what we do. 
It is important to stress that, in turning to dynamics theory and neurobiology, this paper is 
emphatically not arguing that morality and human values reduce to biology. That is the 
position of Haidt and his fellow nativists.  DST is opposed to the reductionist mindset and it 
is opposed to nativist assumptions. Rather, as we will see, it views moral development as 
resulting from the process of emergent self-organisation that requires only an initial value-
bias, not moral blueprints in the head or in the genes as argued by Haidt.  DST provides a 
non-reductive holistic account of development in which events are multi-causal, where 
neither the brain, nor biology, nor the so-called ‘internalisation’ of external norms is 
necessarily in the lead. Moral development and moral action result from multiple factors. 
Moreover, these are always in flux, they have a history and are always contextually situated.  
In this dynamic and multifaceted process of thought, action and development, emotions play 
an important role. 
The overall message of the paper will be that teacher training courses that aim to enhance 
students’ moral and ethical awareness and behaviour should take the role of emotion very 
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seriously. The following section begins by considering a recent review of moral education in 
teacher education, noting that the cognitivist developmental approach has dominated for over 
half a century, and then identifying its shortcomings when viewed from the perspective of 
DST.  
 
 
The Cognitive Developmental Approach to Teacher’s Moral Development 
 
A number of papers emanating from philosophy and psychology have raised concerns 
about ethical and moral matters in teaching and teacher education.  These include papers 
cited in the extensive literature reviews conducted by Cummings et al. (2007) and 
independently by Bullough (2011).  Some of the papers cited have also attempted to suggest 
appropriate pedagogical approaches.  In his review of articles published in Teaching and 
Teacher Education, Bullough (2011) concluded that ‘there is agreement that while limited, 
both pre- and in- service teacher education can facilitate development of moral understanding 
and ethical sensitivity among teachers’ (p.27). In terms of a possible pedagogical approach, 
Strike (1990) argued that the curriculum should teach ‘a set of moral concepts that are highly 
important to the practice of teaching’ (p. 48) and encourage development of student teacher’s 
decision making ability. Mahoney (2009) advocated a ‘reflective critical space’ where student 
teachers might develop ‘ethical literacy’ (p. 984). However, the pedagogy they advocate is 
primarily direct instruction and dilemma discussion, based on cognitive developmental theory, 
which also seems to be the preferred approach in other fields of professional education, such 
as medical education (Miles et al., 1989; Eckles et al., 2005) and business education 
(Desplaces et al., 2007; Izzo, 2000).  
The review by Cummings et al. (2007) also supports the claim that a cognitive 
developmental approach has been prevalent in programmes that are provided to help student 
teachers’ moral and ethical development. Acknowledging that there are sparse empirical 
studies of student teachers’ moral development, her paper presents the results of studies using 
the neo-Kohlbergian Defining Issue Test (DIT). The two premises of DIT studies are: first, 
that when moral development occurs, student teachers are more likely to adopt Lawrence 
Kohlberg’s (1981, 1984) ‘post-conventional’ or ‘principled level’ of reasoning rather than the 
other two lower levels (e.g. pre-conventional and conventional) and, second, that student 
teachers’ level of ‘post-conventional’ thinking is measurable with a ‘self-report 
questionnaire’ such as the DIT.  Adopting these two premises, Cummings and colleagues 
concluded that intervention programmes using direct instruction (e.g. Penn, 1990) and 
dilemma discussion (Reiman, 2001) enhanced student teachers’ moral reasoning ability, but, 
somewhat alarmingly, the levels of moral reasoning demonstrated by education majors were 
consistently lower than other majors (Yeazell & Johnson, 1988; McNeel, 1994; Cummings et 
al., 2001).  They speculate this is because students entering teacher education courses view 
teaching ‘as a less difficult major than others’ and ‘a less reflective student is attracted to 
teaching as a profession’. Also, they suspect that what they call ‘ideational poverty within the 
types of courses education students experience’ prepare teachers to be a ‘technician rather 
than as a critical thinker’ (p. 75). 
These are rather sweeping generalisations and are obviously related to the American 
context in which the research was conducted. Nevertheless, they do open up important 
questions about student teachers’ moral development. One such question is whether any 
impact that moral development intervention programmes might produce continues over the 
long term, after student teachers qualify and start to teach in schools. A more fundamental 
question, however, is whether current assumptions regarding moral and ethical development 
are correct?  The frequently adopted cognitivist approaches (e.g. Kohlbergian and neo-
Kohlbergian), focusing on the development of reasoning skills and the acquisition of ethical 
concepts, have provided handy solutions for curriculum design and teaching methods.  
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However, Haidt (2001) has argued that moral reasoning, the core of the cognitive 
developmental model, is rarely the direct cause of moral judgment and behaviour. Other 
commentators have noted that ‘reasoning is often post-event; a narrative we tell to explain 
and justify our actions, but not the actual reasons or causes’ and ‘we often do not know why 
we do what we do, it is irredeemably below conscious awareness’ (Sankey, 2011, p.419).  If 
correct, these concerns suggest that some radical changes are needed in the assumptions 
underlying much current pedagogy. Haidt chooses to abandon rationality in favour of 
intuition.  This paper stresses the importance of moral reasoning, even when it is post-event, 
but also argues that we need to reconceptualise the notion of rationality, by bridging the gap 
between rationality and action, rationality and emotion. 
Even within the neo-Kohlbergian camp, there is recognition that the cognitive 
developmental model is looking ‘a bit shop warn’ (Lapsley & Hill, 2008).  In direct 
response to that concern, a dynamic systems approach was proposed as an alternative 
comprehensive metatheory or paradigm, able to encompass aspects of the cognitive 
development approach and other approaches, but also go beyond them (Kim & Sankey, 2009).  
For example, it is able to encompass the role of the sub-conscious and emotion in moral 
judgement, while rejecting the dichotomy or dualistic gap that Haidt and the intuitionists set 
up between moral reasoning and moral intuition (including moral emotions).  Dynamics 
theory is opposed to such dichotomies (Overton, 2006; Spencer, et al., 2011).  Moreover, a 
long-standing problem in the cognitive developmental model is the insufficient attention 
given to the role of emotion in human reasoning.  For example, Kristján Kristjánsson (2009) 
has highlighted the ‘marginalisation’ of emotions in the dominant paradigm of the moral self, 
pointing out that even the recent attempt by cognitivists to argue for an integrated model of 
moral functioning relevant to education (Reed et al., 2008) does not successfully incorporate 
emotions into the model.  
However, this points to a deeper problem. There is a tendency within the debate to assume 
that emotion is an entity or ‘thing’ that can or should be incorporated into the developmental 
model, as one more component (like adding one more gadget in a machine), when emotion 
would be much better conceived as embedded within a holistic process of development. In 
other words, what seems to be required is a move from an essentially mechanistic to an 
organic model, in which human rationality, if it is to be truly rational, is conceived as always 
laced or tinged with emotion (Damasio, 1994,1999). Working in the context of DST, Mark 
Lewis (2005 a, 2005b) has provided just such a plausible account of emotion, which 
encompasses processes operating within the embodied and socially embedded brain. Gerald 
Edelman’s (1987, 1989) theory of Neuronal Group Selection comes at the issue from another 
direction, arguing that a ‘value system’, physically located in the old evolutionary brain stem, 
plays a key role in the formation and pruning of synaptic connections, essential to brain 
development.  It would seem from these and other neurobiological studies that ‘the highest 
and most abstract kind of moral thinking is suffused with value, emotion and feeling’ (Kim & 
Sankey, 2009).  In what follows, this paper will further explore this idea, first, by showing 
how DST overcomes the mechanistic, dualistic gap between reasoning and action created by 
cognitive development theory, then considering recent findings from neurobiological studies 
of emotion which address the putative gap between reasoning and emotion, before bringing 
the discussion back to the issue of pedagogy in teacher education.   
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Moral Reasoning and Action from the Perspective of Dynamic Systems Theory 
 
A central issue in moral psychology has been a perceived gap between moral learning and 
moral action.  So one might ask, is moral thinking and reasoning that is learnt in a classroom 
setting actually transferable to real-life decision-making outside the classroom?  If not 
transferable, what would hinder them from being activated and applied in practice?  In the 
context of teacher education the question might become: are student teachers’ moral 
reasoning skills learnt in training transferable to the real-life moral dilemmas they face in 
school, and if not, why not?  From the perspectives of DST this kind of question is based on 
a false dichotomy; nevertheless this dichotomy has been ubiquitous in moral psychology.  
For example, Kristjánsson (2009, 2010) argues that a ‘moral gap’ between moral cognition 
and moral action has been particularly prominent in the post-Kohlbergian era.  He also notes 
that in the field of moral psychology two potential ‘contenders for bridging the gap’ have 
been proposed: the construction of ‘moral selfhood/identity’ as suggested by Augusto Blasi 
(1993) and the cultivation of ‘moral emotions’ (Hoffman, 2000).  Blasi’s (1993) notion of 
‘moral selfhood’, has met with wide-ranging criticisms.  Larry Nucci (2004) said it seems to 
posit a ‘reified homunculus’ and Kristjánsson (2010) suggests that Blasi’s ideal of a moral 
self ‘has simply replaced Kohlberg’s later stages of moral reasoning’ (p. 404).  Indeed, 
Blasi’s notion of a ‘moral self’ still seems to reside in the cognitive developmentalists’ camp, 
as a rather ad-hoc and unnecessary construct.  By contrast, this paper suggests that ‘the 
cultivation of moral emotions’ should certainly play a very important role in teachers’ moral 
development, but not as to bridge to span the putative gap between moral cognition and moral 
action.  
The gap that has been created between cognition and action in moral psychology is similar 
to the gap that is said to exist between pre-existing ‘competence’ and here-and-now 
‘performance’.  To give a concrete example, student teachers on teaching practice may be 
said to be equipped with a professional teaching competence, but their performance is 
observed to fluctuate from lesson to lesson.  In fact, ‘the distinction between competence 
and performance has been a major force in developmental thinking’ (Thelen & Smith, 2006, 
p. 278), but is it valid?  Are there really gaps between cognition and action, competence and 
performance that need to be bridged?  The origins of this kind of dualistic thinking may be 
traced back to Descartes, but in more recent times ‘the competence/performance distinction 
was proposed by Chomsky (1965) in an effort to explain why his theory of innate linguistic 
rules could not predict the wide range of variability observed in actual language usage’ 
(Fischer & Bidell, 2006, p.346). A dynamics approach rejects the ‘competence-performance’ 
dichotomy in favour of a more holistic account (Overton, 2006); there is no logical way of 
deconstructing ‘what is the essential, timeless, and permanent core’ of development 
(competence) ‘and what is only performance’ (Thelen & Smith, 2006, p. 278).  Indeed, what 
could be meant by the idea of a fixed competence that exists independently of any given 
performance?  
What we observe is ‘evidence of variability in performance’ (Fischer & Bidell, 2006, 
p.346).  In the context of sport, for example, it is often said that an athlete is only as good as 
her last performance. The athlete does not have a separate and fixed competence residing 
somewhere in her body or brain, to which her performance on any given occasion can be 
compared.  What she has is a history of performances, some of which will be better than 
others. Similarly, scores on so-called lists of teaching competencies are actually scores of 
performance, as observed on one or more occasions, in particular contexts, influenced by a 
multitude of natural and social circumstances.  In short, the alleged gap between 
competence and performance is illusory, as is the putative gap between moral reasoning and 
action.  Any given action (performance) is a product of multiple factors coming together and 
feeding off each other, with some more salient and some more stable than others.  Or in the 
words of DST, performance is always ‘softly assembled’ here and now, opportunistically 
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recruiting available components; for example, salient memory, cues, and information from the 
given task and context (Thelen & Smith, 1994; Spencer et al., 2011).  The underlying image 
is that performance is always a dynamic process. What students learn in the classroom setting 
is not somehow ‘lost’ in performance, but neither is it the controller of performance.  Moral 
action is always the result of multiple causes and influences working together in unison at any 
given time.  We now need to say a little more about the notion of process in moral 
development. 
The main premise of this paper is that moral development shares the same dynamic process 
found within the whole of human development; a process already identified in this paper as 
‘emergent self-organisation’ (Thelen & Smith, 1994; Prigogine, 1997; Solé & Goodwin, 
2000; Lewis, 2005a, 2005b; Kim & Sankey, 2010).  Marc Lewis (2005a) defines self-
organisation as ‘the spontaneous emergence of order from nonlinear interactions among the 
components of a complex dynamic system’ (p. 173).  Here, ‘non-linearity’ has two 
meanings. First, cause-effect relationships among components (e.g., emotional appraisal, 
memory recruitment) are not unidirectional but bi- or multi- directional and recursive, ‘as 
characterised by multiple feedback cycles’ (p. 173). Second, effects within the system are 
generally neither additive nor cumulative but may be exponential.  Human brains are 
complex dynamic systems that self-organise through constant recursive feedback, signals 
moving rapidly between synapses and between neurons and neuronal groups or maps. 
Synapses ‘are strengthened the more they are used, and they are used the more they are 
strengthened’ (Lewis, 2005a, p.264).  Signals between maps go back and forth, constantly, in 
exceedingly large numbers, and in this dynamic process some of the many connective 
patterns formed become strengthened, because they possess salience or meaning for the 
individual, whereas those not valued are weakened or die’ (Sankey, 2007, p.548).  Whether 
we are observing behaviour at the manifest level of persons or at the level of the biology of 
the brain, the image is dynamic complexity always in flux, not a fixed and static set of rules 
or competencies. 
Nevertheless, over time, students will tend to settle into or ‘prefer’ a limited range of 
manifestations or modes of action. In dynamic systems terminology this ‘preferred’ mode is 
an attractor state.  Accordingly, we can picture an individual’s developmental trajectory as 
moving across a landscape of hills and valleys, some deeper and steeper than others 
(Waddington, 1966; Thelen & Smith, 1994, 2006; Kim & Sankey, 2009). The landscape, 
representing life’s on-going experience, is not static but shifting as hills and valleys form and 
reform over time in response to changing environmental and social circumstances. The 
person’s thoughts and behaviour settle into preferred attractor valleys until they are shifted to 
a new preferred attractor valley. A deep and steep valley will be more stable and harder to 
move from than a shallow valley. Moral development can then be viewed ‘as a trajectory of 
variability, continuously changing and stabilising in interaction with an ever-changing 
environmental landscape where attractor points both form and disappear over time’ (Kim & 
Sankey, 2009).  Any resultant behaviour is the ‘product of parallel, developing, 
heterogeneous components and subsystems within an environmental and task context’ 
(Thelen & Smith, 1994, p. 85). For the most part, stability and instability coexist in people’s 
moral judgment and reasoning, and these are always context-sensitive rather than context-
independent. 
This dynamic and fluid account of development provides a strong corrective to the 
dichotomy between reasoning and action in Kohlbergian and neo-Kohlbergian theory. DST is 
concerned with how mutually constituting factors are assembled together and lead to specific 
thoughts and actions. From this perspective, ‘action expresses cognitive-affective-conative 
meaning’ (Overton, 2006, p.51), so there is no absolute separation between reasoning, 
emotion and action.  Moreover, action and inaction are both actions and the decision not to 
act is a decision, whereas in cognitive theory non-action is portrayed as a failure of willpower 
or lack of motivation to act on a moral decision.  A student may reasonably choose to be 
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either a silent bystander or an activist in a give controversial scenario. Being a silent 
bystander is not necessarily an indicator of failure of will; rather it may be conceived as a 
preferred attractor state of action, like the decision to abstain in an election.  
 
 
The Role of Emotion in Moral Learning and Moral Action, and the Notion of Emotional 
Rationality 
 
Recent findings from neuroscientific studies indicate that in fully functional brains there is 
a strong link between emotion, action, and real-life moral decision-making. Moreover, moral 
decision-making and action can be severely compromised in certain forms of brain damage 
that dampen emotional sensitivity. Arguably, the best-known research is Damasio’s 
investigations of patients with lesions to the ventro-medial prefrontal cortex (VMPFC). These 
patients show ‘impairments of reasoning/decision making and emotion/feeling’ (Damasio, 
1994. p. 61). One such patient, Elliot, who had frontal lobe tissue removed because it had 
been damaged by a tumour, was requested to respond to Kohlberg’s Moral Judgment 
Interview (MJI) along with a number of other questionnaires. The result indicated that he 
retained ‘a capacity to conceptualize means to achieve social objectives, to predict the likely 
outcome of social situations, and to perform moral reasoning at an advanced developmental 
level’ (Damasio, 1994, p. 48). However, despite his normal performance when tested on a 
standardised moral reasoning task, the patient exhibited defective decision-making in real life. 
Damasio (1994) argued that reduced emotional reactivity and feeling, resulting from VMPFC 
damage, prevented the patient from ‘assigning different values to different options, and made 
his decision-making landscape hopelessly flat’ (p. 51).   
In 1999, Damasio reviewed the conclusions he had come to five years earlier. He notes that 
in recent years there has been a growing recognition within science of the role of emotion, so 
that ‘the presumed opposition between emotion and reason is no longer accepted without 
question’ (p.40).  The neurological evidence from his laboratory shows ‘that emotion is 
integral to the process of reasoning’ (p.41).  However, he stresses that this new appreciation 
of emotion does not mean that emotions are ‘a substitute for reason or that emotions decide 
for us’ (p.42), which, as previously noted, seems to be suggested in Haidt’s social intuitionist 
model. Rather ‘well-targeted and well-deployed emotion seems to be a support system 
without which the edifice of reason cannot operate properly’ (p.42). Damasio’s insistence on 
the role of emotion in the process of reasoning would seem to have important messages for 
educating teachers’ moral awareness and reasoning, taking us some way beyond how reason 
has been conceived in the standard cognitive models of Piaget and Kohlberg. Reason and 
emotion go hand in hand. Moral reasoning is inherently emotional. ‘Rational choices, 
according to this view, depend as much on the exercise of emotion and feelings as on logical 
deliberation’ (Sankey, 2006, p. 171). The important educational task is sensitising students to 
keep reason and emotion correlating in balance. 
Working closely with Damasio on a combined psychological and neuroscientific study, 
Immordino-Yang and Sylvan (2010) claim that elevating emotions such as ‘admiration’ are 
not simply matters of conscious appraisals requiring a high-level cognitive process of social 
and cultural cues, they are also associated with the brain’s ‘non-consciously controlled 
regions that regulate the body and consciousness’ (p. 112).  By analysing activation level 
and timing of each brain region using fMRI scanning, it was found that morally motivating 
emotion such as admiration for another person’s virtuous accomplishments involves two 
kinds of processing in the brain: (1) higher level neural systems related to memory retrieval 
and appraisal of current circumstances in light of past learning, and (2) induction of low-level 
systems (e.g. brain stem) related to biological regulation and feelings of the body (gut 
feelings). It is this latter process that gives ‘motivating power’ and ‘the readiness for action to 
body and mind’ (p. 112).  This finding provides a clue to why inspirational stories and films 
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encourage altruistic behaviours in real life.  It also indicates that sub-conscious processes 
associated with “feeling” play an important role in organising action.  
Damasio claims there are strong connections between his model and Gerald Edelman’s 
Theory of Neuronal Group Selection (TNGS), which Damasio sees as a pioneer in the 
neurobiology of consciousness (p. 336).  Edelman’s theory played an important role in 
Thelen and Smith’s (1994) advocacy of DST. As noted earlier, one of the three main tenets of 
Edelman’s TNGS is that a value system or value-bias in the brain plays a key role in the 
process of neural organisation and development.  Value is imposed in the brain by the brain.  
Edelman’s notion of an inherent value system provides an alternative mechanism to nativism 
and modularity proposed by Haidt’s intuitionist theory. There is no need to seek the 
rudiments of morality in an inbuilt blueprint or basic architectural design as advocated by 
nativists.  Rather, following Edelman, they are located in a value-bias or what I have 
elsewhere called a predilection to value built into the sensory system. I need to stress that I 
am not saying that the whole of morality is nothing but a natural predilection to value. 
Morality is highly complex, context dependent and develops within social settings. What I am 
pointing out is that nativists argue for blueprints or devices of one kind or another that are 
said to reside in the genes, such as Haidt’s ‘moral receptors’ or Chomsky’s ‘language 
acquisition device’.  Dynamic Systems Theory, by contrast, argues that none of this 
apparatus is required. All that is required is the natural process of emergent self-organisation 
plus certain ‘valances or tropisms similar to those exhibited by simple organisms and even by 
animals without nervous systems’ (Thelen & Smith, 1994, p.315).  Notice, however, 
positing a predilection to value inherent within every organism does not ‘put a ghost in the 
machine, or if it does, it is the ghost of life itself, for similar biases are exhibited even in 
single cells’ (Thelen & Smith, 1994, p.316).  
Current neurophysiological evidence supports the view that new learning, including our 
moral and ethical learning, does not happen without these biases and valences. For example, 
working specifically within the context of dynamics theory, Marc Lewis has emphasised the 
role of emotion in the recursive signalling feedback process between neurons.  According to 
Lewis (2005b), emotion is intimately involved in ‘organizing activity patterns spanning 
multiple neural systems, both within occasions and over development. Neural substrates of 
emotion can be seen to influence structural changes underlying all domains of development’ 
(p. 253). Lewis (2005a) delineated this process using the metaphor of a ‘double-edged sword’.  
‘On one hand, self-augmenting feedback, orchestrated by limbic and paralimbic structures 
with the help of ascending neuromodulators, promotes synaptic activity and hence initiates 
synaptic change. In this respect, emotional processes yield novel synaptic configurations. On 
the other hand, self-stabilizing feedback, orchestrated by the same structures and 
neuromodulators, but lasting longer and recruiting additional subsystems, consolidates 
patterns of synaptic activity and hence minimizes synaptic change’ (p. 262). A key point to 
notice for our discussion is that emotion is not simply something that occurs at the level of 
everyday psychology, nor is it simply a social or cultural construct.  Rather it is prior to 
conscious experience and essential to the functioning and regulation of the brain. 
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Towards a Pedagogy of Emotional Rationality and Ethical Literacy 
 
We began this paper by pointing out that teachers are expected to act as moral agents, but 
that this is often overlooked or marginalised in teacher education courses. Even when 
included, it is often based on a cognitive developmental approach that has underestimated the 
role of emotion in moral functioning. In the foregoing discussion, this paper has argued that 
emotion is integral to all forms of reasoning, including moral reasoning. In what follows, 
some practical implications will be explored. The main message of this paper, so far, is that 
student teachers do need to develop their moral awareness as part of their professional profile 
and that this must include a clear acknowledgement of the role of emotion in moral 
functioning.  The next issue is how this can be translated into pedagogy? 
There has, in fact, been a long-standing discussion on the issue of educating the emotions, 
especially within Philosophy of Education (Bantock, 1986; Peters, 1972, Warnock, 1986). 
Bantock (1986) expresses agreement with R. S. Peters that ‘the education of the emotions is 
inescapably a moral matter’ rather than ‘a matter of development’, providing examples where 
‘evil emotions have been fostered’ or where ‘emotions have failed to play an appropriate role 
in judgements’ (p. 141). Though this paper does not share his aversion to the notion of 
‘development’ and would argue that he conceptualises development in a rather limited and 
narrow sense when compared with the more expansive view of DST, his appreciation of 
emotion’s role in rationality is certainly important.  
In parallel with this philosophical and theoretical debate, several explicit approaches have 
been suggested aimed at the development of affective aspects of personhood. Arguably, the 
best-known approaches are ‘virtues’ and ‘character’ education and ‘emotional competence’ 
education.  However these initiatives have come under considerable criticism, which casts 
doubt on whether they could provide the basis for a pedagogy that cultivates student teacher’s 
morality. For example, character education has been implemented in schools and also 
advocated in teacher education (Lumpkin, 2008).  It has been defined as ‘the deliberate 
effort to develop good character based on core virtues that are good for the individual and 
good for society’ (Berkowitz & Bier, 2005). However, Kristjánsson (2010) notes that it is 
vulnerable to the charge of promoting ‘uncritical conformism and conservatism’ (p. 397).  
Cognitive developmentalists have expressed concern that approaching morality in terms of a 
"bag of virtues" (Kohlberg & Turiel, 1971) can easily lead to moral relativism. Unbridled 
relativism is certainly problematic, but there is a cultural dimension because the selection of 
virtues depends on the varying expectations about the good life and the ideal person that 
necessarily vary across different cultural and subcultural groups. What is ‘good for the 
individual and good for society’ will depend at least in part on the social and cultural context.  
Arguably more damaging is the verdict of the American Institute of Education Sciences, 
reporting in 2010 on the school-wide Social and Character Development (SACD) intervention 
programs. The Report concluded that ‘the analysis of the year-by-year impacts did not yield 
evidence that the seven SACD programs… improved student social and character 
development’ (p. xlvi).  It also noted that one possible reason is ‘failure of the 
conceptualization and design of the intervention’ (p. li).  Meanwhile, attempts to develop 
emotional competence arising from the construct of Emotional Intelligence have also met 
considerable criticism. Daniel Goleman’s (1995) description of emotional intelligence as 
‘character’ and ‘meta-ability’ is not convincingly distinct from other psychological constructs 
(Matthews et al, 2006) and seems conceptually muddled.  Furthermore, despite the emphasis 
given to empathetic ability within emotional competence, moral educators have criticised its 
lack of ‘moral ballast’ (Kristjánsson, 2010, p. 397).  From the perspective of DST and 
neurobiology, the notion of a separate emotional intelligence makes little sense.  As already 
argued, emotion is an integral part of thought and action whether viewed in terms of our 
everyday lives or at the level of the complexity of brain functioning. Emotions take their 
place within the process of ‘evolving wholes’ (Fogel, 1993; Lewis, 1995, 1996; Scherer, 
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2000).   
Given the shortcomings in these and other available approaches, is it possible to move 
towards an alternative holistic theoretical base and pedagogy, in teaching and teacher 
education?  Our previous discussion has already laid down some helpful markers. We began 
this paper by noting that previous attempts to address the development of teachers’ ethical 
awareness have been patchy. Part of the problem has been the lack of a convincing theoretical 
base. We discussed the dominant cognitivist developmental approach, and the opposing 
intuitionist alternative. We saw that both models are founded on a misconception of 
rationality, which does not incorporate emotion. In seeking an alternative third way, this paper 
adopted a dynamics approach and has proposed that cultivating teachers’ moral and ethical 
awareness should be based on the notion of emotional rationality, where rationality and 
emotion go hand in hand; not only as manifested in what we think and do at the macro-level, 
but also at the micro-level of the functioning brain.  We also noted the importance of 
creating a reflective critical space where student teachers can develop ethical literacy. Let us 
now look at this idea in more detail.  
There have been a number of references to developing ethical literacy in the context of 
professional education, such as Davidson and Morrissey (2011) in regard to the profession of 
psychology.  They say that ethically literate citizens have ‘a disciplined knowledge of, and 
theoretical approach to, moral decision making. They have a vocabulary for talking about 
morality. Their vocabulary acquires meaning from their knowledge of a number of moral 
philosophical perspectives’ (p. 45).  This is certainly helpful, though I would argue it 
provides a rather static view of knowledge and decision making, in contrast to the view 
expressed in this paper that what we know is often in flux and what we do is often highly 
dependent on circumstance.  Also, while the development of vocabulary is certainly an 
important ingredient of moral literacy, the meanings acquired are generated as a result of 
life’s on-going trajectory and not restricted to what they call ‘philosophical perspectives’, 
though these should play their part in the holistic educative process.  What is strikingly 
missing from Davidson and Morrissey’s paper is the role of emotion in ethical literacy, the 
important relationship between language and felt meaning and the emotional impact on 
decision-making and action. Consequently, the pedagogy they offer, which contains the kinds 
of seminar exercises advocated by the cognitivists such as dilemma case discussion and so 
forth, are pitched at engendering discussion (on ethical theory and justice), but entirely 
overlook the emotional element in human thought and the generation of meanings. My 
argument has been that this has to be included in what is meant by ethical literacy. 
Ethical literacy is therefore defined here as comprising three different but overlapping 
components.  In the context of teacher education, these are: 
(a) An understanding of past and present models of morality, including theories of 
moral development and moral philosophy; 
(b) A vocabulary of ethical discourse and decision-making that allows teachers to 
critique not only moral theory, but also real-life moral statements and actions as 
experienced in practice; 
(c) Emotional sensitivity and empathy, which incorporates the ability to recognise and 
articulate ethical meanings and relevance in practice. 
Courses of teacher education should therefore: impart some understanding of moral 
development and theories of ethical decision making; teach ethical vocabulary and encourage 
dialogue regarding moral and ethical concerns; enhance emotional sensitivity and empathy, 
and; allow students to practice incorporating moral issues and concerns into classroom 
practice. 
It is to the credit of University of Sydney, Australia, that all student teachers study Human 
Development and Education as a core unit of study.  Whereas philosophy has been almost 
completely expunged from the teacher education programme, students nevertheless learn 
about moral development theory in the lecture component of the Unit and engage with the 
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vocabulary of moral discourse in the accompanying seminar component. The Unit introduces 
dynamic systems theory as a new meta-theory in human development where students’ 
abilities and performances are viewed as self-organising from multiple factors and influences, 
and they are introduced to the concepts of ‘emotional rationality’ and ‘ethical literacy’.  
Opportunities to develop ethical literacy and engage in moral sensitivity often arise when 
discussing issues of importance in teacher education. For example, when students are 
considering the long debate on the relationship between intelligence and race (using audio-
visual aids such as video clips of expert interviews and photos of eugenic centres,) student 
teachers gain a new sensitivity toward the possible misuse of psychological testing and ethnic 
stereotyping in their classrooms.  
In the tutorial seminar component of the Unit students undertake a task aimed at 
developing their moral awareness and emotional sensitivities. Working in small groups, 
student teachers from different majors (e.g. art, mathematics, science, humanities and social 
sciences) plan a lesson on an important value such as ‘peace’ or an issue such as ‘caring for 
our world’. They are asked to imagine that the school is developing a cross-curricular tutorial 
programme that will include lessons on moral values.  In planning the content of their lesson 
they have to begin by choosing the age group they will target, and then plan their lesson not 
simply to convey information, but also engage the children emotionally in the topic in a 
balanced and educationally appropriate manner.  Each group of student teachers presents 
their lesson plan to their peers, with each presentation lasting close to 30 minutes.  Their 
peers provide feedback on the lesson plan that has been presented.  Based on their 
experience of preparing the lesson and the feedback received for peers and the tutor, each 
member of the small groups prepares a reflective report saying what changes they would like 
to make to their plan if actually teaching it in school, and why.  
In some ways this might seem a fairly standard lesson-planning task, but the specific aim 
of this exercise is to create a discreet reflective critical space where student teachers can begin 
to develop ethical literacy.  What we have found is that in the process of planning and 
presenting the lesson plan, intuition, rationality, and emotion are operating in unison through 
constant feedback.  We also see the student teachers shifting their positions, in their thoughts 
and feeling, in response to undertaking this collaborative exercise and in the course of 
feedback and critical reflection.  The deep attractors representing deeply held views often 
become shallower and shift in response to the dynamics of the learning environment provided 
by this exercise; new thoughts emerge while others dissolve or re-form. On reflection, 
students are able to appreciate just how much their emotions are influencing their intuitions 
and rational judgements, sometimes positively and productively, sometimes not.  As a 
teacher educator, one hopes that the experiences gained in this Unit of study are significantly 
meaningful that they impact memory and are thus retained long-term into their careers as 
teachers, but only time will tell. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
This paper began by noting teachers are expected to act ethically and morally and that there 
is evidence that teacher education can facilitate the development of moral understanding and 
ethical sensitivity.  It also noted, however, that the way this is attempted, if at all, is based on 
cognitive development theory even though it is widely recognised that it is open to serious 
criticism and, at the very least, is in need of considerable rethinking. In particular, cognitive 
theory and the alternative social intuitionist theory, fail to appreciate that human rationality is 
emotional rationality. The approach advocated in this paper advocates the notion of emotional 
rationality and is strongly influenced by dynamic systems theory.  But theory on its own is 
not enough. If teachers are really going to develop their moral awareness, such that it impacts 
on their actions, opportunities need to be identified in teacher education courses for engaging 
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students with moral and ethical issues and appropriate pedagogies need to be developed.  
Building on insights drawn from dynamics theory, a number of possible strategies have been 
proposed for developing student teachers’ ethical literacy, in such a way that they will be 
better prepared to respond to the moral and ethical challenges they will inevitably face in 
their professional practice. 
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